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The European Court of Human Rights’ recent decision in the case of Köksal v. Turkey 
(http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-174629)has sparked once again a fierce debate concerning the so-
called availability of domestic remedies in Turkey in the aftermath of the 15 July 2016 attempted coup. The
case concerns a teacher’s dismissal by emergency Decree No. 672 (https://rm.coe.int/16806a2e17), along
with 50,875 other public servants who were regarded as having membership of or an affiliation, link or
connection with terrorist organizations or structures, formations or groups determined by the National
Security Council to engage in activities against the national security of the Turkish State.
The Court’s decision
The applicant complained of a breach of his right of access to a court, his right to be presumed innocent
and his right to be informed of the accusation against him (Article 6 §§ 1, 2 and 3 (a) of the European
Convention of Human Right (ECHR-). He also complained that he had been dismissed on the basis of acts
which did not constitute a criminal offence at the time they were committed (Article 7-no punishment
without law), and that his rights and freedoms under Articles 8 (right to respect for private and family
life), 10 (freedom of expression), 11 (freedom of assembly and association), 13 (right to an effective
remedy) and 14 (prohibition of discrimination) had been violated.
The Court dismissed the application for failure to exhaust domestic remedies, finding that a new remedy
was available to the applicant, provided by Decree No. 685
(http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-REF(2017)014-e), which
was adopted on 2 January 2017. Decree No. 685 provides for the creation of a commission, namely the
‘State of Emergency Inquiry Commission’, tasked with assessing the measures adopted directly by the
emergency decrees issued in the context of the state of emergency, including the dismissals of civil
servants. After months of apparent stonewalling, the rules of procedure of the Commission were finally
published on 12 July and the Commission finally began receiving applications on 17 July.
A systematic failure to provide effective domestic remedies
Admittedly, there are many lingering questions that cry out for legal analysis of the Commission’s
operations. Perhaps, the most obvious one is whether the Commission can meet the fair trial requirements
under Article 6 ECHR, as there are serious indications suggesting otherwise with regard to its impartiality,
independence and enormous caseload. I do not aim to provide insights into those important aspects,
referring instead to an article (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2943518) by Kerem
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Altıparmak.  Rather, I will confine myself to one particular – perhaps, the most striking – aspect: the
question of a systematic failure to provide effective domestic remedies in today’s Turkey. I strongly believe
that there is now substantial evidence that the alleged violations may be much wider than simply a denial
of access to court.
In the months leading up to the creation of the Commission, there was considerable confusion as to the
availability or accessibility of domestic remedies. The Turkish Constitutional Court (TCC), the apex court
of the country, held in a number of judgments, that it had no jurisdiction to examine the constitutionality
of emergency decrees enacted during a state of emergency. As to judicial review of the emergency
measures in the aftermath of the 15 July coup attempt, more than 100,000 individual applications were
lodged with the TCC. The Court, however, has ruled only in a single case
(http://www.kararlaryeni.anayasa.gov.tr/Content/pdfkarar/2016-22169.pdf) concerning the applicants’
complaints of inter alia the sheer length of and the justification for their detention, in which it simply
dismissed the application on 20 June 2017. It should also be recalled that the TCC dismissed two of its
members based solely on ”the information from the social circle” and “the common conviction formed by the
members of the TCC” in a decision of 9 August.
(http://www.constitutionalcourt.gov.tr/inlinepages/press/PressReleases/detail/pdf/2016-12.pdf)
Similarly, in its three separate judgments on 4 October 2016 (http://www.danistay.gov.tr/arsiv.html), the
Turkish Council of State also declared itself incompetent to consider an action for annulment – e.g one
application lodged by a magistrate dismissed by the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HCJP) – and
referred cases back to the administrative courts for examination. In turn, the administrative courts had
previously rejected numerous cases concerning the dismissal of public servants directly by emergency
decrees, holding that the emergency decrees function as laws (not administrative actions) and therefore,
cannot be subjected to judicial review by administrative courts.
Despite the level of marked reluctance at the Turkish national level, in its earlier judgments arising out of
alleged violations in Turkey in the aftermath of the attempted coup on 15 July 2016, the ECtHR
surprisingly considered an effective domestic remedy to be “available” in each individual case (first, on 8
November 2016 in the case of Mercan v. Turkey (http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-169094); then, on 29
November 2016 in the case of Zihni v. Turkey (http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-169704) and finally, on
7 March 2017 in the case of Çatal v. Turkey (http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-172247)).  Then, relying
on the principle that the safeguard mechanism established by the ECHR is subsidiary to national human
rights protection systems, the Court held all these applications inadmissible. In doing so, however, the
ECtHR has consistently failed to examine the context and pattern in which the alleged violations took
place, as it consistently found that the individual applicants, based on the particular facts of their
complaints, had a domestic remedy “available” to them.
Reacting to Mercan and Zihni cases, in an earlier post (https://www.ejiltalk.org/has-the-european-court-
of-human-rights-turned-a-blind-eye-to-alleged-rights-abuses-in-turkey/) on EJIL: Talk!, I argued that the
Court left open the question as to whether domestic remedies are truly “effective and available” in today’s
Turkey and outlined some valid reasons as to why those remedies cannot be regarded as such in a state of
emergency context. I concluded the blog post arguing that the Court – even at the time of those decisions –
may have failed to appreciate that ‘these dismissals may effectively deprive the applicants of any
meaningful justice whatsoever, by requiring that they first try to navigate the legal chaos in Turkey.’ The
total abdication by the Turkish courts of their judicial duty to perform a meaningful legal review on the
emergency measures after more than one year of state of emergency rule, unfortunately, supports this
conclusion.
The same appears to be true for the Köksal case in which the Strasbourg court asserted that Decree No. 685
put an end to the uncertainty as to the availability of a proper judicial review for the emergency measures
dismissing public servants in the wake of the failed coup. But did it really?
The right to an effective remedy
The right to an effective remedy, as guaranteed under Article 13 ECHR, is one of the most vital provisions
in the Strasbourg system of human rights control. While some judges have called it the ‘most obscure’
provision due to complex questions regarding its language and precise objective within the ECHR regime
(i.e. when Judges Matscher and Farinha partly dissented in Malone v. UK (http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?
i=001-57533)), its importance cannot and should not be underestimated. If this right is operating
effectively, a claim asserting a practice of systematic violations of other rights and freedoms is less likely to
exist. Nevertheless, the remedy issue at the ECHR level has been viewed primarily as a technical issue,
concerned with an uncritical scrutiny of the question of non-exhaustion under Article 35, because these
two provisions have been regarded, above all, as central to the co-operative relationship between the
ECHR and national legal systems. This is all the more so in light of the fact the ECHR is granting a wider
margin of appreciation to states by providing more subsidiarity, particularly with regard to Article 35, over
the past half-decade following the Brighton Declaration. (For an excellent analysis, please see an article
(https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2993222) by Mikael Rask Madsen)
Generally it is also obvious that, in principle, an effective remedy for individual complaints requires a
proper functioning of the overall system of national remedies and an effectively functioning judicial
system in which people have trust when they seek redress for their grievances. Accordingly, in situations
of gross violations, the most likely scenario is that domestic remedies are unavailable or ineffective when
invoked. As the now defunct European Commission recognized in Greek case
(https://www.jstor.org/stable/27878926?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents), ‘[w]hen there is a practice of
non observance of certain Convention provisions the remedies prescribed will of necessity be side stepped
or rendered inadequate (…) Judicial remedies prescribed would be rendered ineffective by the difficulty of
securing probative evidence, and administrative inquiries would either not be instituted or if they were,
would likely to be half hearted and incomplete.’
Large-scale human rights violations
Without doubt, such is the case in Turkey. Generally speaking, the emergency measures undertaken by the
Turkish authorities to date do indeed suggest that the post-coup measures have reached an unprecedented
level, targeting a wide swathe of economic, social and cultural rights, and civil and political rights. More
than 130,000 persons (in the appended lists of the decrees and, by decisions of the relevant administrative
bodies in toto), including the applicant in the Köksal case, have been dismissed from their posts, including
more than 4,400 judges and public prosecutors. Despite these massive numbers, the decrees do not set out
clear criteria for the dismissals, nor do they require adversarial proceedings or individualised reasoning.
The memorandum (https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?
command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=2952586&SecMode=1&DocId=2392872&Usage=2)
by the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe merits quoting in extenso: “the persons in
question were not provided with evidence against them and were unable to defend themselves in an
adversarial manner in many cases. Many had also not been aware of any investigation against them until
their dismissal was notified to them by the administration or published in a decree. It has been reported
that the operation of the administrative commissions has also been very opaque, and the Commissioner
received allegations that certain decisions were based on simple hearsay or a global impression about the
person, based for example, on their social environment.”
Accordingly, it would appear that the problem in Turkey may – indeed, should – be regarded as more
wide ranging and fundamental than a failure to obtain relief at the national level due to lack of access to a
court. The ECtHR, however, has consistently failed to examine the substance of the allegations of large-
scale human rights violations to which the dismissals seem to give rise. Instead, the Strasbourg Court has
adopted a narrow approach in order to reduce the overwhelming number of pending cases before it and
has thus turned a blind eye to the shattered lives of the purged public servants in Turkey.
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